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[L. A. No. 19622. In Bank. June 25, 1946.]

EDWIN RUE MONROE, Petitioner, v. SUPERIOR COURT
OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, et al., Respondents.
[1] Divorce-Separa.te Maintenance-Decree.-A separate maintenance decree does not end the marriage, and therefore does
Dot end the obligation to support which arises out of the
marriage rela.tionship; 1t only regulates the extent of that
support.
[2] Id. - Separate Maintenance-Modification of Allowance.-A
decree of separa.te maintenance can be modified on a showing
of changed circumstances. This rule is applicable to the period
for which support is granted as well as to the amount thereof.

[2) See 1 Cal.Jur. 1037; 27 Am.Jur. 33.
MeK. Dig. References: [11 Divorce and Separation, § 166; [2,3)
Divorce and Separation, § 171; [4) DiYorce and Separation, § 169;
[5) Prohibition, § 40.

)

428

lioNROE fl. SUPERIOR COURT

f28 C.2d

[3] Id.-Separate Maintenance-Modi1lcation of Allowance.-The
trial court has jlll'i~rliction to modify a separate maintenance
decree by ~anting a wife additional support· after the decree
has become final and the period hae: elapsed during which payments were to be made, even though the court did not reserve
jurisdiction to do so at the time it rendered the decree. Such
jurisdiction exists indepndently of any provision in the decree
as long as the parties remain married.
[4] lei. - Separate Maintenance-Duration of Allowance.-Since
the trial court has power under certain circumstances to deny
any maintenance to a wife, it may give her an allowance for
a limited period only.
[5] Prohibition - Separate Maintenance Proceedings.-A writ of
prohibition will not lie to restrain a hearing on a wife's application to modify a decree of separate maintenance where the
trial court would have the power to modify such decree if
there was a sufficient change in circumstances.

PROCEEDING for writ of prohibition to restrain the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County and John Beardsley,
Judge thereof, from modifying a judgment for separate maintenance. Writ denied.
Reynolds & Painter and I.ouis Miller for Petitioner.
J. H. O'Connor, County Counsel, Douglas De Coster, Deputy
County Counsel, and Hahn, Ross & Goldstone for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-A decree 01 separate maintenance ordered
petitioner to pay his wife, for 27 months, $250 per month for
her support and $50 per month for the support of their child.
The decree provided that at the end of that period the payments for the support of the child shoUld be increased to $100
per month. The court expressly reserved jurisdiction to make
further orders regarding the support of the child, but made
no such reservation as to the support of the wife. Petitioner
complied with the decree. After the expiration of the 27
months petitioner's wife applied for a modification of the
decree and a further allowance for her support, alleging that
the circumstances upon which the decree was based had materially changed. Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to
restrain respondent court from proceeding in the matter on
the ground that it lacks jurisdiction to modify the decree.
A writ of prohibition can issue in this case only if, despite
changed circumstances, the trial court lacks jurisdiction to
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grant petitioner's wife a further allowance for her support.
Hence, the question is not what changes in circumstances
would justify the court in modifying its decree, assuming that
it has the power to do so, but whether it has that power, assuming a sufficient change in circumstances.
[1] The right to support arises out of the marriage relationship. (Civ. Code, § 155.) .A separate maintenance decree
does not end the marriage, and therefore does not end the
obligation to support; it only regulates the extent of that
support. [2] It is settled that a decree of separate maintenance can be modified upon a showing of changed circumstances. (Civ. Code, § 137; O'Toole v. O'Toole, 215 Cal. 441,
443 [10 P.2d 461]; Smith v. Smith, 113 Cal. 268, 271 [45
P. 332]; Booth v. Booth, 100 Ca1.App. 28. 32 [279 P. 458];
Pa1'ker v. Parker, 74 Cal..App. 646, 654 [241 P. 581], and cases
cited in 42 C.J.S. § 626, n. 62.) This rule is applicable to the
period for which support is granted as well as to the amount
thereof. Just as it may become necessary to increase the
amount of support for a period of special needs, 80 it may
become necessary to grant support for a period not eovered
by the original decree.
[S] Petitioner contends that section 137 of the Civil Code,
which authorizes the court to modify its orders in a separate
maintenance action, should be given a construction comparable
to that of section 139 with respect to alimony in the case of a
divorce. He relies upon Long v. Long, 17 Cal.2d 409 [110 P.2d
383], and Tolle v. Superior Court, 10 Ca1.2d 95 [73 P.2d 607],
which held that the court has no power to modify a decree
of divorce by granting a wife support after the decree has
become final and the period has elapsed during which payments were to be made, unless the court reserved the power
to do 80. In Tolle v. Superior Court, supra, and Long v. Long,
mpra, the parties were no longer husband and wife when the
attempt was made to have the court modify its decree. In contrast, section 137 presupposes that the parties remain married.
When it divorce has been granted and the marital relation
has ceased to exist, the jurisdiction that the court had over
matters of support is exhausted unless the court has reserved
it in an authorized manner. In the present case, however,
there was no need for the court to reserve jurisdiction at the
time it rendered its decree, for its jurisdiction would continue
&8 long as the marital relationship continued. The order that
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gave a 27-month allowance to petitioner's wife did not give
the court any jurisdiction over that allowance that it would
not otherwise have had. Nor did it deprive the court of any
jurisdiction that it otherwise would have had, for the court
cannot divest itself of such jurisdiction while the parties remail} married. So long as they are married, the court cannot
refuse to consider whether the husband should be required to
support his wife, for it not only has the power to grant an
allowance to the wife for her support, but it may also have the
duty to do so under certain circumstances. In Baumgarten
v. Baumgarten, 107 N.J.Eq. 274 [151 A. 606], the wife was
awarded $5,000 in a lump sum for her separate maintenance
in a decree that went even farther than the one in the present
case, since it expressly stated that payment of that sum would
permanently discharge the husband's obligation. Two years
later the court nevertheless held that upon a showing of
changed circumstances the wife would be entitled to a further
allowance for her support. "The court cannot divest itself
of the authority and the duty to make such further orders
touching the support and maintenance of the wife as may be
just and equitable. The order of March 21, 1928, should be
interpreted to mean that the payment of the gross sum of
$5,000 should satisfy the claims of the complainant against the
defendant for maintenance only until equity and justice require the payment of additional sums." (107 N.J.Eq. 274, 280.)
[4] Since the court has power under certain circumstances
to deny any maintenance to the wife, it may give her an allowance for a limited period only. The court determined in the
present case that given the circumstances in which the parties
found themselves when the decree was rendered, petitioner's
wife should be gh'en an allowance for 27 months only. When
the decree was rendered, petitioner's wife apparently had no
objection to losing her allowance at the end of the 27 months,
for she did not appeal from the decree. She does not now
contend, however, that the court should then have given her
an allowance for a longer period. She merely contends that
circumstances have so changed that the court should now give
her anot11er allowance. In Binkow v. Binkow, 298 Mich. 609
[299 N.W. 734], the trial court granted separate maintenance
to the wife for a period of two years. After that period
elapsed the wife sought a further allowance for her support.
The Supreme Court of Michigan denied her such allowance
on the ground that she had made no showing of changed cir-
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cumstances. [6] The court may similarly conclude in the
present case that petitioner's wife is not entitled to the modification that she seeks_ Petitioner cannot preyent the court.
however, from passing upon that question.
Petitioner contends that Erken'brach v. Erken'brach, 96 N. Y.
456, and Koehl v. Koehl, 92 Misc. 579 [156 N.Y.S_ 234], support his position. Those cases are distinguishable, however, for
they are concerned only with a question of statutory construction, and the statute involved, unlike section 137 of the
Civil Code, did not allow the decree to be modified under an~\'
circumstance.'!. Moreover, those cases involved decrees of limited divorce, whereas the present case is one of separate
maintenance. It t'! not necessary to determine here in what
respects an action for separate maintenance differs from actions for limited divorce. divorce from bed and board or
judicial separation, as th.ey are variously known (see 3 Nel·
son, Divorce and Annulment (2d ed., 1945) § 32.05) for, a~
it exist'! in California, it differs from them in one respe(·t
that make.'! the New York cases inapplicable. A limited di,
vorce places the relationship of the pa.rties beyond the reMh
of either of them alone. They are still married in tIle sen<;e
that neither may remarry. but they are no longer married ill
the sense that either can give the other the choice of resnmiJl~~
the marital relation or being guilty of desertion. As bet.we(,11
themselves the parties are in the same position as they art'
after a decree of absolute divorce. The California law make~
no provision for such limited divorces. It was expressly so
held in McMullin v. McJfullin, 123 Cal. 653 [56 P. 5541, and
although Grant v. Grant, 68 Cal.App. 23 [228 P. 412], con·
tains a dictum to the contrary, the question was definitel:
settled in Cardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Cal.2d 762 [68 P.2d 3511.
In that case the husband obtained a Nevada divorce some tell
years after his wife had secured a decree' of separate mainte·
-·-nancein this state .. The husband then moved to stop his pa~'
ments under that decree. The wife countered with an attac};
"upon the divorce and the content.ion that the maintenance
decree had established that not she but her husband was at
fault. This court held that, although t.hat decree established
she was the innocent party when it was rendered, her attack
upon the divorce must fail, for the evidence disclosed that the
husband may have made a suhsequent offer in good faith to
ful1ill his marital obligations and that she may thereafter have
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given him a cause of action for divorce. It is clear that had
the decree that she secured been a decree of limited divorce, a
subsequent offer to resume marital relations could have DO
effect, at last not until it was .accepted.
Petitioner's application for a writ of prohibition is denied
and the alternative writ heretofore issued is discharged.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., and Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J .-1 dissent. This proceeding in prohibition
tests the question whether a trial court has jurisdiction to enter
in a separate maintenance action a decree which finally and
conclusively adjusts the property rights of the spouses and is
not subject to modification upon a showing of changed circumstances.
Here the trial court entered a decree of separate maintenance which contains no reservation of jurisdiction as to
property rights or otherwise, and which purports to be a final
decree and to fully and forever settle the reciprocal rights
and obligations of the parties. It makes provision for support
of a minor child; it awards to the wife as her sole and separate property the family home, with all furniture, furnishings, and equipment therein; it awards to her the specific
amount of $250 a month to be paid by the husband for twentyseven months commencing on a specified date, and certain insurance which is to be kept in force by the husband for her
benefit and that of the child: it awards the husband, as his
sole and separate property, a certain automobile, bank funds,
tax bonds, and war savings bonds.
Were such a decree entered in a divorce action, it would be
final and the writ of prohibition would lie to restrain a hearing
in modification proceedings (Tolle v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. ,
2d 95 [73 P.2d 607]). (See, also, Puckett v. Puckett, 21Ca1. _~________ _
2d 833 [136 P.2d 1J, and review of authority therein; Long
v. Long, 17 Cal.2d 409 [110 P.2d 383J; McClure v. McClure,
4 Cal.2d 356 [49 P.2d 584, 100 A.L.R. 1257J; Harlan v. Harlan, 154 Cal. 341 [98 P. 32J: White v. White, 130 Cal. 597
[62 P. 1062, 80 Am.St.Rep. 150J; McKay v. McKay, 125 Cal.
65 [57 P. 677J; O'Brien v. O'Brien, 124 Cal. 422 [54 P. 225J;
Greer v. Greer, 31 Cal.App.2d 39 [87 P.2d 388];) The same
would be true if the parties, under similar circumstances,
had voluntarily entered into a property settlement agreement
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which was fair and equitable at the time it was made. (See
13 Cal.Jur. §§ 45, 46, pp. 846-847.) The "utmost freedom of
contract respecting property exists in California between
husband and wife." (13 Cal.Jur. § 45, p. 847; Perkins v. Sunset Tel. &- Tel. Co., 155 Cal. 712, 719 [103 P. 190]; Civ. Code,
§§ 158. 159.) It is contended, however, that in the case of a
separate maintenance decree, a different rule applies, and that
such a decree is always subject to modification upon a showing
of changed circumstances. Many general statements of this
rule may be cited. (42 C.J.S. §§ 626, 627, pp. 270 et seq.; 27
Am.Jur. § 428, p. 33; 3 Nelson on Divorce and Annulment
(2d ed.) § 32.44, p. 414; 71 A;L.R. 724; 127 A.L.R. 741.)
In California section 137 of the Civil Code provides that
"The court, in granting the husband or wife permanent sup;
port and maintenance of himself or herself, •.• • shall make
the same disposition of the community property and of the
homestead. if any, as would have been made if the marriage
had been dis..o;olved. • . • The final judgment in such action
may be enforced by the court or by such order or orders as in
its discretion it may from time to time deem necessary, and
such order or orders may be varied, altered or revoked at the
discretion of the court."
A similar section with respect to divorce (Civ. Code, § 139),
provides that "Where a divorce. is granted for an offense of
the husband, the court may compel him to . . • make such
suitable allowance to the wife for her support, during her
life or for a shorter period as the court may deem just, having
regard to the circumstances of the parties respectively; and
the court may from time to time modify its orders in these
respects. "
Since the latter section has been construed to permit the
entry in a divorce actionofa finalJl.djudication of property
right.o; (eases above cited), it WIOuld seem by analogY that sec·
tion 137 should be subjected to a similar construction. No
California case has been found which expressly holds other·
wise, but there are a number of cases in which modificatiom;
have been approved, and in them, as well as in the California
text (1 Ca1.Jur. § 87, pp. 1037-1038), there are general state·
ments to the effect that separate maintenance decrees may be
modified upon a proper showing. In none of these cases is
the question directly presented or is it expressly declared that
the court lacks Jurisdiction to enter a final decree, which is not
subject to modification, in a separate maintenance suit.
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In O'Toole v. O'Toole, 215 Cal. 441 [10 P.2d 461], a monthly
allowance was decreed "until the further order of court," and
under this reservation of jurisdiction, proceedings were entertained for the purpose of determining whether changed circumstances warranted a modification. Booth v. Booth. 100
Cal.App. 28 [279 P. 4581. is an appeal from an original decree,
as is Parker v. Parker, 74 Cal.App. 646 r241 P. 581]. In
Smith v. Smith. 113 Cal. 268 r45 P. 3321. a modification was
denied.
One theory advanced in support of the position that the
court i~ powerless to make a final adjudication in a separate
maintenance suit is that responsibility for support of the wife
rests upon the husband as long as the marital status endures
and. as a matter of public policy, no termination of her allowance ~hould be countenanced which might leave her indigent
and dependent upon the state f01" support. This theory, however. ignores entirely the rights of husband and wife who have
separated. to settle their property right~ and obligations by
contract. Furthermore, so far as the possibility of a helpless
'IpOllSe being thrown upon the state for support is concerned.
there is little difference between termination of an allowance
by finll] decree of separate maintenance and termination by
final decree of divorce. In both case.~ the right to support
arOSf ont of the marriage obligation (Civ. Code, § 155), and
is enf01'C'ible to the full extent of that obligation as adjudicated
b~' t.he court.
In other words. the right to support is not measured by the
continuance of t.he marital status. It is but an incident of that
status and ma~' be settled or litigated independently of it. The
\·j(>w that so long as the parties are married. the court is powerIcss to finall~' adjudicate the right to support, gives rise to the
correlati"e view that {)nce the marriage -has been severed by
dh'Ol'ee. the right to' support cease.~ even though it may not
hav(> heen lit.igated in the divorce proceeding. The evil and
injustiee which result from adherence to this view under
present "oeia! conditions are shown in the dissenting opinion of
1\11'. .J ustiee Rchauer in the recent case of Crouch v. Crouch,
ante. pp. 24-~, 262 [169 P.2d 897] in which I concurred.
(See. also. eoncurring opinion in DeYoung v, DeYoung, 27
Ca1.2d 521. 527 [165 P.2d 457] ,) The only logical conclusions, in my opinion, is that t.he right to support, which is an
incident to the marriage relation, may be litigated finally and
conclusively either during the existence of the marriage or
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after it has been severed; that tlections 137 and 139 of the
Civil Code are analogous and should be similarly construed;
that under such a construction, the decree here involved must
be held to be final; and that writ of prohibition will lie.
Schauer, J. t concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied July
24, 1946. Carter, J. t and Schauer, J.t voted for a rehearing.
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